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Abstract
Resources are rarely distributed uniformly within a population. Heterogeneity in the
concentration of a drug, the quality of breeding sites, or wealth can all affect evolutionary
dynamics. In this study, we represent a collection of properties affecting the fitness at a given
location using a color. A green node is rich in resources while a red node is poorer. More
colors can represent a broader spectrum of resource qualities. For a population evolving
according to the birth-death Moran model, the first question we address is which structures,
identified by graph connectivity and graph coloring, are evolutionarily equivalent. We prove
that all properly two-colored, undirected, regular graphs are evolutionarily equivalent (where
“properly colored” means that no two neighbors have the same color). We then compare the
effects of background heterogeneity on properly two-colored graphs to those with alternative
schemes in which the colors are permuted. Finally, we discuss dynamic coloring as a model
for spatiotemporal resource fluctuations, and we illustrate that random dynamic colorings
often diminish the effects of background heterogeneity relative to a proper two-coloring.
Keywords: environmental variation; fixation probability; graph coloring; natural selection
Introduction
The survival of a mutant introduced into a population depends on its fitness as well as environ-
mental factors, including the population’s spatial structure. Variations in migration patterns or
dispersal can be modeled using a graph, where nodes represent individuals and edges represent
neighborhoods. On such a graph, a standard measure of a mutant’s success is the probability that
it takes over the population (“fixes”) [1–10]. It is known that there is a class of structures, which
includes regular graphs, in which all graphs have the same fixation probabilities as those of an
unstructured population, a result called the “isothermal theorem” [11]. Our concern here is with
an analogue of this result for colored graphs, where each color represents a collection of fitness-
influencing resources, in order to work toward a better understand the effects of background
fitness heterogeneity on evolutionary dynamics.
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Resource heterogeneity naturally results in variations in environmental conditions. For exam-
ple, the local concentrations of nutrients (sugar) can vary across a population of E. coli bacteria.
Locations with higher sugar concentration lead to higher reproductive fitness. However, in popu-
lations with more than one type of individual, resource heterogeneity can affect the fitness of the
different types asymmetrically. Competing E. coli strains often metabolize different sugar types
(e.g. glucose or lactose). Thus, variations in the concentration of one sugar type predominantly
affect the fitness of one E. coli strain and not the other [12, 13]. The evolution of drug resistance is
another notable example. The existence of a variable drug distribution across a population (e.g.
a drug “gradient”) can have a strong effect on the onset of drug resistance in microbial evolution
[14, 15]. Similar observations have been made in the contexts of virus [16–21] and cancer [22, 23]
dynamics.
Driven by the ubiquity of heterogeneity within populations, there has been growing interest
in understanding how it affects selection in simple mathematical models. Much of this work,
ranging from earlier models in population genetics [24–27] to those with more fine-grained spa-
tial structure [28–35], is summarized in a prequel to this study [36] (which deals with well-mixed
dispersal structures and spatially-modulated fitness). However, a general understanding of the
effects of heterogeneous resource distributions within structured populations is still lacking. The
subtlety of resource heterogeneity in evolutionary dynamics arises from the interplay of sev-
eral different parameters: the spatial structure and migration patterns in the population; how
each genotype is affected by different concentrations of the resource; the spatial distribution of
resources themselves; and finally the fitness of each competing type in the absence of heterogene-
ity. Due to this complexity, a good deal of the work in this area has been done through numerical
simulations of agent-based models with specific structures and fitness distributions.
In this work, we consider heterogeneous resource distributions in graph-structured popula-
tions. A distribution of resources within a structured population can be represented by a colored
graph, wherein the color of a node represents the resources at that location [30]. Our primary
focus is on properly two-colored graphs, which have two distinct node colors together with the
property that no two nodes of the same color are neighbors. Each node holds one individual,
either a mutant (type A) or a resident (type B). For evolutionary updating on such a graph, we
consider a variant of the well-known Moran process [37], which is a birth-death process with one
replacement in each time step. A proper two-coloring of the graph in this context implies that
an offspring’s resources are always different from those of the parent (except, of course, from the
trivial case in which the colors have no meaningful effects on the types).
The first question we ask is which population structures and resource distributions result in
the same evolutionary dynamics, as measured by the fixation probability of an invading mu-
tant. For properly two-colored graphs in which all nodes of a given color have the same degree
(“biregular”), we give an explicit formula for the fixation probability of a rare mutant that is
valid for any intensity of selection (Theorem 1). We use this formula to derive a simple condition
for when selection favors the mutant type relative to the resident (Theorem 2): if gA and gB are
the geometric means of the fitness values of A and B, respectively, on the two possible colors of
the nodes, then selection favors A relative to B if and only if gA > gB.
We then consider the effects of resource redistribution within a fixed structure, focusing on the
notion of an “optimal” distribution of resources with respect to the evolutionary process. On a
cycle, a proper two-coloring is typically optimal in the following sense: any reshuffling of colors
away from a proper two-coloring leads to a decrease in fixation probability for advantageous
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mutants and an increase in fixation probability for disadvantageous mutants. We find that this
behavior reversed on the star, and it lies somewhere in between on other bipartite graphs with
unequal numbers of green and red nodes.
Finally, we explore dynamic graph colorings arising from resource mobility. Resources are
redistributed occasionally through a shuffling of the node colors. We find that resource mobility
attenuates the effects of background heterogeneity, at least when the level of background hetero-
geneity is not too large. In some cases, when redistribution occurs at every time step, the effects
of background heterogeneity can be completely offset.
Results
We begin by modeling the spatial structure of a population with a graph, in which vertices
represent locations and edges represent neighbors. The adjacency matrix of this graph,
(
Γij
)N
i,j=1,
satisfies Γij = 1 if i and j are neighbors and Γij = 0 otherwise. There are two types of individuals
on the graph, mutants (A) and residents (B), and each vertex is occupied by exactly one of these
two types. When the individual at vertex i reproduces, the offspring is propagated to vertex j
with probability Γij/Γi, where Γi := ∑Nk=1 Γik is the out-degree of vertex i. The Moran process
[37] is obtained by choosing one individual to reproduce in each time step, with probability
proportional to fitness.
Whereas it is usually assumed that the fitness of i depends on only its type (A or B), here
we are concerned with fitness that depends on local environmental conditions in addition to an
individual’s type. To include environmental conditions, we assume that each vertex is assigned
a color. For simplicity, we focus on graphs with two possible colors, green and red. For example,
a green node might be rich in resources while a red node is poorer. More colors can be used
to model a broader spectrum of resource values. We assume the total abundance of resources is
constant and does not get degraded over time, which implies that the number of nodes of any
given color remains fixed over the course of the evolutionary process.
A vertex coloring, C, is a function that maps every vertex to a discrete set of values (color set).
A coloring map, C, is proper if no two nodes of the same color are connected to each other, i.e.
C (i) 6= C (j) whenever Γij = 1. A graph is called n-colorable if it can be properly colored with n
colors. A graph with N vertices is trivially N-colorable, but often times a graph can be properly
colored with fewer colors. The smallest number of colors for which a proper coloring is possible
is known as the chromatic number of the graph [38]. We are interested in graphs whose chromatic
number is 2, which are also known as “2-chromatic” or “bipartite” graphs (see Fig. 1).
The effects of a color on fitness are described by a color-to-fitness map, which maps each color
to an ordered set of fitness values, one for each type. For example, in the space of two types, A
and B, and two colors, green (G) and red (R), the color-to-fitness map can be specified succinctly
by a payoff matrix,
( G R
A aG aR
B bG bR
)
. (1)
In other words, on a green node, A has fitness aG and B has fitness bG. On a red node, A has
fitness aR and B has fitness bR. In evolutionary game theory, such a payoff matrix is usually
3
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Figure 1: Examples of graphs with proper two-colorings: a, cycle; b, complete, symmetric bipartite graph; c, square
lattice (von Neumann neighborhood); d, hexagonal lattice; e, complete, asymmetric bipartite graph; and f, star (an
extreme case of e). If the fitness of A and B are aG and bG on a green site and aR and bR on a red site, respectively,
then on each of these graphs we can explicitly calculate the probability that one type replaces the other (Theorem 1).
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used to define payoffs for one type against another. Here, this matrix gives the payoffs for a type
against the environment.
To quantify the effects of the coloring scheme on evolutionary dynamics, we study the mutant
type’s fixation probability, ρA, which is the probability that a single, randomly-placed A eventu-
ally takes over a background population of type B. Similarly, the probability that a single B fixes
in a background population of type A is denoted by ρB. Selection is said to favor A relative to
B if ρA > ρB [39, 40]. For all graphs of the variety depicted in Fig. 1, we can calculate fixation
probabilities explicitly:
Theorem 1. Consider a graph with a proper two-coloring, with NG green nodes and NR red
nodes. If every green node has degree kG and every red node has degree kR, then the mean
fixation probability of A appearing uniformly at random in a background population of B is
ρA =
1− 1
NG + NR
{
NG
bR (aRkG + bGkR)
aR (aGkR + bRkG)
+ NR
bG (aGkR + bRkG)
aG (aRkG + bGkR)
}
1−
(
bR (aRkG + bGkR)
aR (aGkR + bRkG)
)NG ( bG (aGkR + bRkG)
aG (aRkG + bGkR)
)NR . (2)
Similarly, the mean fixation probability of B appearing uniformly at random in a background
population of A is
ρB =
1− 1
NG + NR
{
NG
aR (bRkG + aGkR)
bR (bGkR + aRkG)
+ NR
aG (bGkR + aRkG)
bG (aRkG + aGkR)
}
1−
(
aR (bRkG + aGkR)
bR (bGkR + aRkG)
)NG ( aG (bGkR + aRkG)
bG (bRkG + aGkR)
)NR . (3)
Remark 1. Under the assumptions of Theorem 1, we must have NGkG = NRkR. Thus, NG = NR
if and only if kG = kR (the graph is regular), in which case ρA is independent of the degree.
From Theorem 1, we can derive a simple condition for selection to favor A:
Theorem 2. For a graph satisfying the hypotheses of Theorem 1,
ρA > 1/N > ρB ⇐⇒ ρA > ρB ⇐⇒ aGaR > bGbR. (4)
We give proofs of Theorems 1–2, as well as an extension to weighted, directed graphs, in the
Appendix.
Parametrizing heterogeneity
Let rA and rB represent the mean fitness values of A and B, respectively, over all locations in the
population, i.e.
rA =
NGaG + NRaR
NG + NR
; (5a)
rB =
NGbG + NRbR
NG + NR
. (5b)
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Figure 2: Selection condition when aG = r + σA, aR = r− σA, bG = 1 + σB, and bR = 1− σB. The graph is bipartite,
regular, and properly two-colored with NG = NR = 50. The difference between fixation probabilities of the two types,
ρA − ρB, is shown for several values of σA and σB when r = 1.5. Warmer colors represent greater differences between
the fixation probabilities, ρA − ρB. A is neutral relative to B if and only if r2 − σ2A = 1− σ2B.
The difference between the fitness of A on a green node, aG, and the mean fitness of A, rA, is
denoted σGA := aG − rA. Similarly, for type B on a green node, we let σGB := bG − rB. Since we
usually consider green nodes to be beneficial, it is typically the case that σGA , σ
G
B > 0. In this way,
these two parameters quantify the (beneficial) effects of green nodes on the two types. On the
other hand, red nodes are usually deleterious, which means that the quantities σRA := rA− aR and
σRB := rB− bR are at least zero and quantify the degree to which red nodes are harmful to the two
types. By Eq. 5, we must have NGσGA = NRσ
R
A and NGσ
G
B = NRσ
R
B . In particular, the heterogeneity
can be parametrized by just two values, σA := σGA (mutant heterogeneity) and σB := σ
G
B (resident
heterogeneity). (Note, however, that these parameters are added to fitness on green nodes and
subtracted from fitness on red nodes.) By Theorem 2, the selection condition is
ρA > 1/N > ρB ⇐⇒ ρA > ρB ⇐⇒ (rA + σA) (NRrA − NGσA) > (rB + σB) (NRrB − NGσB) .
(6)
Fig. 2 illustrates this selection condition when NG = NR = 50, rA = 1.5, and rB = 1.
Several natural special cases emerge from this general accounting of heterogeneity:
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Figure 3: Effects of background heterogeneity on a complete bipartite graph with NG = NR = 5. Background
heterogeneity increases the fixation probability of an advantageous mutant (black lines) and decreases that of a dis-
advantageous mutant (white lines). These effects are monotonic in background heterogeneity, σ. By Theorem 1, this
behavior is identical to that of a regular (not necessarily complete) properly two-colored graph with equal numbers
of green and red nodes.
(i) symmetric environmental interactions: σA = σB;
(ii) asymmetric environmental interactions: σA = −σB;
(iii) mutant heterogeneity: σB = 0;
(iv) resident heterogeneity: σA = 0.
Note that each of these cases is a one-parameter model of heterogeneity. Our main focus here is
on (i), where the coloring affects the fitness of the two types symmetrically. We refer to this case
as “heterogeneous background fitness” and use σ to denote the parameter σA. For simplicity, we
also let rB = 1 and r := rA.
For example, if NG = NR = N/2, then, under heterogeneous background fitness, Eq. 2
simplifies to
ρA =
r (r− 1)(
r2 − σ2) (1−( 1− σ2
r2 − σ2
)N/2) . (7)
From this expression, we see that the fixation probability of a mutant is an increasing function
of σ when the mutant is advantageous (r > 1), a decreasing function of σ when the mutant is
disadvantageous (r < 1), and independent of σ when the mutant is neutral (r = 1). This result is
depicted in Fig. 3 on a graph with NG = NR = 5.
Resource redistribution and optimal colorings
On a colored graph, shuffling the node colors does not change the overall number of each color
present in the population. In other words, shuffling leaves the total resource value constant. Hav-
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Figure 4: Effects of background heterogeneity for alternative colorings on two-colorable graphs. In each panel, we
plot fixation probability against background heterogeneity for all (non-isomorphic) permutations of the proper two-
coloring shown at the top. The proper two-coloring in each case is depicted in black, which is given by Eq. 2. a,
On the cycle, the proper two-coloring is “optimal” in the sense that it gives the maximum fixation probability for an
advantageous mutant and the minimum fixation probability for a disadvantageous mutant. b, On the star, we observe
the opposite behavior, with the proper two-coloring giving the minimum fixation probability for an advantageous
mutant and the maximum for a disadvantageous mutant. c, On a complete bipartite graph with NG 6= NR (shown
here with NG = 3 and NR = 7), a mixture of these two results is possible. In particular, there need not be a coloring
that is “optimal” for all levels of background heterogeneity. The fixation probabilities in all panels were approximated
by building transition matrices for each process and looking at the exact distribution after 107 steps.
ing established formulas for fixation probabilities on biregular, properly two-colored graphs, we
now turn to fixation probabilities on graphs with various permutations of proper two-colorings.
This model of permuted colorings is related to (and inspired by) the work of Mahdipour-Shirayeh
et al. [32], which explores how increasing the standard deviation of a bimodel fitness distribu-
tion affects fixation probabilities in simple structured populations. In the model we consider, we
permute the colors at the beginning of the process and then leave them fixed for the remainder.
On the cycle, we find that shuffling the colors away from a proper two-coloring attenuates the
effects of background heterogeneity (Fig. 4a). On the star with NG = 1 and NR = N − 1, there
are just two non-isomorphic colorings, one proper and one non-proper. Moving from the proper
coloring to the non-proper coloring increases an advantageous mutant’s fixation probability and
decreases that of a disadvantageous mutant (Fig. 4b), which is strictly the opposite of the behavior
observed for the cycle. In between these two population structures is a complete bipartite graph
with 1 < NG < NR < N. On such a structure, the effects of moving away from a proper
coloring are not quite as uniform: for some values of background heterogeneity, an advantageous
mutant’s fixation probability is increased, while it is decreased for other values of σ (Fig. 4c).
Dynamic coloring and resource mobility
So far, we have considered the case in which resources (and thus environmental conditions) are
spatially distributed across the population but fixed over time. In many cases, resources and
local conditions change over time as well. For example, an area with rich soil or a good climate
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can deteriorate with time, leading to poorer conditions (and vice versa). Resource agents, such as
nutrients in a heterogeneous population of bacteria, can be mobile and diffuse across an evolv-
ing population. It is therefore natural to consider the effects of heterogeneity on evolutionary
dynamics when the distribution of resources is itself dynamic.
Spatial and temporal heterogeneity have been observed (separately) to have quite different
effects on the fixation probability of a mutant [35]. Here, we consider a model that combines
these two kinds of heterogeneity. For simplicity, we focus on a graph-structured population with
two colors. We consider a simple model of dynamic coloring in which, at each time step, the
colors on the graph are shuffled according to a random permutation. To control the speed of
resource movements, we assume that a shuffling happens with some fixed probability, p. With
probability 1− p, there is no movement and the color scheme remains the same as it was in the
previous time step. This model is similar to others involving “motion” [41, 42], except here it
acts on resources rather than traits.
As examples, we consider an undirected cycle, star, and another complete bipartite graph
with NG 6= NR for several values of the shuffling rate, p. Fig. 5 shows the fixation probability
as a function of σ starting from a two-colored assignment. For p = 0, Theorem 1 gives the exact
fixation probability of A. As p increases, the effects of resource heterogeneity weaken, as long as
the level of background heterogeneity is not too high. However, when background heterogeneity
is sufficiently strong and the population is asymmetric, resource mobility can actually strengthen
the effects of heterogeneity on a mutant’s fixation probability, relative to the fixed proper two-
coloring when p = 0 (Fig. 5c).
Discussion
Sources of heterogeneity abound in nature, at all scales. The distribution of a drug across a tumor
can be highly heterogeneous due to non-uniformity in the vasculature as well as in the tumor’s
tissue-like structure [23]. A good breeding site may give a bird an advantage, which is sometimes
connected to its own behavior [43]. A good school district can have a profound impact on one’s
education and career progression [44], and inherited wealth may positively affect reproductive
success [45]. On the flip side, many modeling scenarios require environmental heterogeneity
together with frequency-dependent fitness (i.e. “games”). Provided selection is sufficiently weak,
analytical results on the effects of heterogeneity on an evolving population can be derived in that
setting as well [see 46]. In contrast, the analytical results presented here hold for any selection
strength, with the trade-off being that they require the assumptions of frequency-independent
fitness and sufficient regularity in the population structure and coloring scheme.
While these assumptions are somewhat restrictive, they allow for a formal analysis of the
model that reveals several interesting effects of background heterogeneity. When heterogeneity
affects the two types (A and B) in the same way, it can increase an advantageous mutant’s
fixation probability and decrease that of a disadvantageous individual. As the graph becomes
more heterogeneous, here in the form of having unequal numbers of green and red nodes, both
the effects of heterogeneity and the relationship between proper and non-proper colorings on the
graph grow more nuanced. Our focus here was on an analogue of the isothermal theorem [11] for
colored graphs, but other classes of colorings on more complicated heterogeneous graphs would
also be relevant for understanding the evolutionary implications of background heterogeneity.
In addition to earlier work in population genetics, several steps have recently been taken to
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Figure 5: Fixation probability in the presence of dynamic resources on bipartite graphs. ρA is shown here as a function
of resource heterogeneity, σ, for several values of the resource redistribution rate, p, and mutant mean fitness, r. The
population initially has a proper two-coloring. At each time step, with probability p the colors are shuffled according
to permutation chosen uniformly at random. With probability 1− p, the coloring is not changed in that time step. In
a and b, high environmental fluctuations (i.e. large p) attenuate the effects of background heterogeneity relative to
the initial distribution of resources at p = 0 (corresponding to a proper two-coloring, shown in black and given by
Eq. 2). In c, this behavior holds for all but the highest levels of background heterogeneity. The fixation probabilities
in all panels were approximated by building transition matrices for each process and looking at the exact distribution
after 107 steps.
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better understand the roles of heterogeneity in evolutionary dynamics [29, 31–33, 35, 36, 47].
However, a complete picture remains elusive. Due to the complexity of analyzing models that
account for heterogeneity, such an understanding likely will not emerge for some time. Given
the rapid development of the Moran model in structured populations over the past decade-and-
a-half, we see generalizations involving both spatial and temporal resource heterogeneity to be
natural next steps, both for their mathematical intrigue and their applicability to the heterogene-
ity that is present in nearly every natural population.
Methods
Calculating fixation probabilities
Consider a colored graph of size N in which each node is occupied by a single individual of type
A (mutant) or B (resident). The fitness of a type depends on both the type itself and the color
of its node. We denote the fitness of A and B at location i by ai and bi, respectively. The fitness
values belong to a finite set defined by the number of colors. For example in case of two colors,
green and red, the possible fitness sets for mutants are two values, ai ∈ {aG, aR}, where aG and
aR denote the fitness of A on green and red sites, respectively. Our focus is on graphs with two
colors, having NG green nodes and NR red nodes.
Directed, weighted graphs
The probability that an offspring produced at site i replaces an individual residing at a neigh-
boring location, j, is determined by a directed, weighted dispersal graph with matrix
(
wij
)N
i,j=1,
having no self-loops (meaning wii = 0 for i = 1, . . . , N). In a standard extension of the Moran
model to graphs, an individual at location i replaces j with probability proportional to the prod-
uct of i’s fitness and the edge weight wij [11]. The overall structure of the population is defined
by both this dispersal graph and the coloring of the nodes.
A state of the process can be described by a vector, x ∈ {0, 1}N , where xi = 1 (resp. xi = 0)
indicates that the individual at location i has type A (resp. B). The total fitness of type B in the
population is ∑Nj=1
(
1− xj
)
bj. Multiplying each location j by the edge weight wji if i has type A
(and by 0 otherwise), we see that the probability of losing a mutant in location i is proportional to
∑Nj=1
( (
1− xj
)
bj
)(
wjixi
)
, where the term
(
1− xj
)
bj corresponds to the birth of type B and wjixi
corresponds to the death of a neighboring type A. Similarly, the probability of gaining a mutant
at location i is proportional to ∑Nj=1
(
xjaj
)(
wji (1− xi)
)
. Finally, the probability that location i
neither gains nor loses a mutant is proportional to
N
∑
j=1
(
xixjaj + (1− xi)
(
1− xj
)
bj
)
wji. (8)
It follows that the probabilities of losing and gaining a mutant in state x are
P−i (x) =
∑Nj=1 xi
(
1− xj
)
bjwji
∑Nj,k=1
(
xjaj +
(
1− xj
)
bj
)
wjk
; (9a)
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P+i (x) =
∑Nj=1 (1− xi) xjajwji
∑Nj,k=1
(
xjaj +
(
1− xj
)
bj
)
wjk
, (9b)
respectively. Conditioned on a change in mutant frequency (meaning the process cannot remain
in the same state, provided this state is non-absorbing), the transition probabilities are given by
Q−i (x) =
P−i (x)
∑Nk=1
(
P−k (x) + P
+
k (x)
) = ∑Nj=1 xi (1− xj) bjwji
∑Nj,k=1
(
(1− xk) xjajwjk + xk
(
1− xj
)
bjwjk
) ; (10a)
Q+i (x) =
P+i (x)
∑Nk=1
(
P−k (x) + P
+
k (x)
) = ∑Nj=1 (1− xi) xjajwji
∑Nj,k=1
(
(1− xk) xjajwjk + xk
(
1− xj
)
bjwjk
) . (10b)
For ζ1, . . . , ζN ∈ R and x ∈ {0, 1}N , let ζx denote the product ζx11 · · · ζxNN . Let {Xn}n>0 repre-
sent the state of the process, with Xn = x indicating that the state of the population at time n is
x. Due to the well-known connection between fixation probabilities and martingales [see 48], we
are first interested in finding ζ1, . . . , ζN ∈ R for which
{
ζXn
}
n>0 is a martingale with respect to
{Xn}n>0, which means that E
[
ζXn+1 | X0, X1, . . . , Xn
]
= ζXn for every n > 0. Since {Xn}n>0 is
a Markov chain and the law of Xn+1 depends on only Xn, it suffices to find ζ1, . . . , ζN ∈ R such
that E
[
ζXn+1 | Xn
]
= ζXn . Using Eq. 9, we see that
E
[
ζXn+1 | Xn = x
]
=
N
∑
i=1
(
P−i (x) ζ
xζ−1i + P
+
i (x) ζ
xζi
)
+
(
1−
N
∑
i=1
(
P−i (x) + P
+
i (x)
))
ζx. (11)
Therefore, by Eqs. 9–10, the equation E
[
ζXn+1 | Xn = x
]
= ζx is equivalent to
N
∑
i=1
(
P−i (x) ζ
xζ−1i + P
+
i (x) ζ
xζi
)
+
(
1−
N
∑
i=1
(
P−i (x) + P
+
i (x)
))
ζx = ζx
⇐⇒
N
∑
i=1
(
Q−i (x) ζ
−1
i + Q
+
i (x) ζi
)
= 1. (12)
By Eq. 10, we see that Eq. 12 holds for every x ∈ {0, 1}N if and only if
0 =
N
∑
i,j=1
xi
(
1− xj
)
bjwji
(
ζ−1i − 1
)
+
N
∑
i,j=1
(1− xi) xjajwji (ζi − 1)
=
N
∑
i=1
[
N
∑
j=1
bjwji
(
ζ−1i − 1
)
+
N
∑
j=1
aiwij
(
ζ j − 1
)]
xi
−∑
i<j
[
bjwji
(
ζ−1i − 1
)
+ ajwji (ζi − 1) + biwij
(
ζ−1j − 1
)
+ aiwij
(
ζ j − 1
)]
xixj (13)
for every x ∈ {0, 1}N . The right-hand side of Eq. 13 is a multi-linear polynomial representation of
a pseudo-Boolean function (i.e. a mapping {0, 1}N → R) that is identically zero, so its coefficients
must also all be zero by uniqueness of this representation [49, 50]. Therefore, for every i, j =
1, . . . , N, we obtain the system of equations
N
∑
j=1
bjwji
(
ζ−1i − 1
)
+
N
∑
j=1
aiwij
(
ζ j − 1
)
= 0; (linear terms) (14a)
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bjwji
(
ζ−1i − 1
)
+ ajwji (ζi − 1) + biwij
(
ζ−1j − 1
)
+ aiwij
(
ζ j − 1
)
= 0. (quadratic terms) (14b)
Let ρA (x) denote the fixation probability of type A when starting in the initial configuration
x ∈ {0, 1}N . If there exist ζ1, . . . , ζN ∈ R solving Eq. 14, then it is well-known that the martingale
property yields
ζx11 · · · ζxNN = (1− ρA (x)) + ρA (x) ζ1 · · · ζN (15)
[see 36, 48]. Solving for ρA (x) gives a fixation probability of
ρA (x) =
1− ζx11 · · · ζxNN
1− ζ1 · · · ζN . (16)
Thus, in what follows, we can reduce the problem of calculating fixation probabilities to finding
ζ1, . . . , ζN ∈ R that satisfy Eq. 14.
In general, there need not be a solution to Eq. 14. However, with a few simplifying assump-
tions, we can reduce this system of equations to something more manageable. Specifically, we
seek a solution to this system for which ζi depends on only the color of i. For every node i, we use
the notation i ∼ G (resp. i ∼ R) to denote that i is colored green (resp. red). The first assumption
is that the graph is properly two-colored, which means that wij = 0 whenever i, j ∼ G or i, j ∼ R.
The second assumption is that the indegree is the same for all nodes of the same color, as is the
outdegree. Let winG and w
out
G (resp. w
in
R and w
out
R ) denote the indegree and outdegree, respectively,
of green (resp. red) nodes. Under these assumptions, such a solution to Eq. 14a requires
bR
(
ζ−1G − 1
)
winG + aG (ζR − 1) woutG = 0; (17a)
bG
(
ζ−1R − 1
)
winR + aR (ζG − 1) woutR = 0. (17b)
It is straightforward to see that the unique solution to these equations is given by
ζG =
bRwinG
(
aRwoutR + bGw
in
R
)
aRwoutR
(
aGwoutG + bRw
in
G
) ; (18a)
ζR =
bGwinR
(
aGwoutG + bRw
in
G
)
aGwoutG
(
aRwoutR + bGw
in
R
) . (18b)
Now, the equation resulting from the quadratic terms of Eq. 14, i.e. Eq. 14b, requires(
bR
(
ζ−1G − 1
)
+ aR (ζG − 1)
)
wji +
(
bG
(
ζ−1R − 1
)
+ aG (ζR − 1)
)
wij = 0; (i ∼ G, j ∼ R)
(19a)(
bG
(
ζ−1R − 1
)
+ aG (ζR − 1)
)
wji +
(
bR
(
ζ−1G − 1
)
+ aR (ζG − 1)
)
wij = 0. (i ∼ R, j ∼ G)
(19b)
For the expressions in Eq. 18 to satisfy Eq. 19 as well, it must be the case that
wji/wij =
{
winG /w
out
G
(
= woutR /w
in
R
)
i ∼ G, j ∼ R;
winR /w
out
R
(
= woutG /w
in
G
)
i ∼ R, j ∼ G. (20)
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On a graph satisfying these properties, Eq. 16 says that the fixation probability of a mutant whose
initial location is chosen uniformly at random is thus
ρA =
1− 1
N
(NGζG + NRζR)
1− ζNGG ζNRR
=
1− 1
N
{
NG
bRwinG
(
aRwoutR + bGw
in
R
)
aRwoutR
(
aGwoutG + bRw
in
G
) + NR bGwinR (aGwoutG + bRwinG )aGwoutG (aRwoutR + bGwinR )
}
1−
(
bRwinG
(
aRwoutR + bGw
in
R
)
aRwoutR
(
aGwoutG + bRw
in
G
))NG ( bGwinR (aGwoutG + bRwinG )
aGwoutG
(
aRwoutR + bGw
in
R
))NR
=
1− 1
N
{
NG
bR
(
aRwinG + bGw
out
G
)
aR
(
aGwoutG + bRw
in
G
) + NR bG (aGwoutG + bRwinG )aG (aRwinG + bGwoutG )
}
1−
(
bR
(
aRwinG + bGw
out
G
)
aR
(
aGwoutG + bRw
in
G
))NG ( bG (aGwoutG + bRwinG )
aG
(
aRwinG + bGw
out
G
))NR . (21)
Undirected, unweighted graphs
The process described in the previous section is a modification of the Moran process due to
Lieberman et al. [11] that allows for general, weighted and directed graphs. When the graph
is undirected and unweighted, the Moran process described in the main text can be recovered
with an appropriate choice of
(
wij
)N
i,j=1. Suppose that
(
Γij
)N
i,j=1 is the adjacency matrix for such
a graph, i.e. Γij ∈ {0, 1} and Γij = Γji for every i, j = 1, . . . , N. As before, we assume that
there are no self-loops in the graph, so Γii = 0 for i = 1, . . . , N. We let the probability of
transitioning from i to j in one step of a random walk on the graph be pij := Γij/∑Nk=1 Γik. If an
individual is selected for reproduction with probability proportional to fitness, and the offspring
is subsequently propagated to a random neighboring node, then the probabilities of losing and
gaining a mutant at location i in state x ∈ {0, 1}N are
P−i (x) =
∑Nj=1 xi
(
1− xj
)
bj pji
∑Nj=1
(
xjaj +
(
1− xj
)
bj
) ; (22a)
P+i (x) =
∑Nj=1 (1− xi) xjaj pji
∑Nj=1
(
xjaj +
(
1− xj
)
bj
) , (22b)
respectively. Note that these equations are identical to those of Eq. 9 when
(
wij
)N
i,j=1 =
(
pij
)N
i,j=1.
Since
(
pij
)N
i,j=1 is stochastic, the outdegree of every node is 1. Suppose that this graph is bi-
partite and properly two-colored, with NG green nodes and NR red nodes (see Fig. 1). Following
our assumptions in the last section, we assume here as well that all nodes of a given color have
the same indegree. Let pinG and p
in
R denote the indegrees of green and red nodes, respectively. By
Eq. 20, we have pji = pinG pij whenever i ∼ G and j ∼ R and pji = pinR pij whenever i ∼ R and
j ∼ G. Since the graph is connected, these equations imply that there exist kG and kR such that
pij = Γij/kG when i ∼ G and pij = Γij/kR when i ∼ R. In particular, all green nodes have kG
neighbors and all red nodes have kR neighbors (i.e. the graph is “biregular”).
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For this kind of graph, we can simplify the expressions of Eq. 18 to get
ζG =
bR (aRkG + bGkR)
aR (aGkR + bRkG)
; (23a)
ζR =
bG (aGkR + bRkG)
aG (aRkG + bGkR)
. (23b)
It then follows from Eq. 21 that the fixation probability of a randomly-placed mutant is
ρA =
1− 1
N
{
NG
bR (aRkG + bGkR)
aR (aGkR + bRkG)
+ NR
bG (aGkR + bRkG)
aG (aRkG + bGkR)
}
1−
(
bR (aRkG + bGkR)
aR (aGkR + bRkG)
)NG ( bG (aGkR + bRkG)
aG (aRkG + bGkR)
)NR . (24)
Swapping the roles of A and B results in a formula for ρB as well, proving Theorem 1. In
particular, any regular graph (meaning kG = kR, which requires NG = NR) has the same fixation
probabilities as the complete bipartite graph with NG green nodes and NR (= NG) red nodes
(Fig. 1b).
Example 1 (star graph). On the star graph with one red node at the center (see Fig. 1f), we have
NG = kR = N − 1 and NR = kG = 1. Plugging these quantities into Eq. 24 gives the formula
ρA =
1− 1
N
{
(N − 1) bR (aR + bG (N − 1))
aR (aG (N − 1) + bR) +
bG (aG (N − 1) + bR)
aG (aR + bG (N − 1))
}
1−
(
bR (aR + bG (N − 1))
aR (aG (N − 1) + bR)
)N−1 ( bG (aG (N − 1) + bR)
aG (aR + bG (N − 1))
) . (25)
Finally, we conclude with the proof of Theorem 2. Suppose that ρA = 1/N, the fixation
probability of A under neutral drift. By Eq. 24, with ζG and ζR given by Eq. 23, we have
NG (1− ζG) + NR (1− ζR) = 1− ζNGG ζNRR . (26)
Consider the function f (x, y) := NG (1− x) + NR (1− y)− 1 + xNG yNR , which satisfies f (1, 1) =
0. If (ζG, ζR) 6= (1, 1) and f (ζG, ζR) = 0, then the function g (t) := f (1− t + tζG, 1− t + tζR)
is differentiable and vanishes at both t = 0 and t = 1. By Rolle’s theorem, there must exist
t∗ ∈ (0, 1) for which g′ (t∗) = 0. Letting x∗ := 1 − t∗ + t∗ζG and y∗ := 1 − t∗ + t∗ζR be the
corresponding values of x and y, we see that
g′ (t∗) =
∂ f
∂x
(x∗, y∗) (ζG − 1) + ∂ f
∂y
(x∗, y∗) (ζR − 1)
= −NG
(
1− (x∗)NG−1 (y∗)NR
)
(ζG − 1)− NR
(
1− (x∗)NG (y∗)NR−1
)
(ζR − 1) . (27)
Since the numerators and denominators in Eq. 23 are positive, and since we have the identities
aR (aGkR + bRkG)− bR (aRkG + bGkR) = kR (aGaR − bGbR) ; (28a)
aG (aRkG + bGkR)− bG (aGkR + bRkG) = kG (aGaR − bGbR) , (28b)
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it follows that 1− ζG and 1− ζR must have the same sign (positive, negative, or zero). Since
(1− x∗, 1− y∗) lies in the same quadrant as (1− ζG, 1− ζR), it cannot be true that g′ (t∗) = 0.
Therefore, Eq. 26 is satisfied if and only if ζG = ζR = 1, which in turn happens if and only if
aGaR = bGbR. For bipartite, properly two-colored, biregular graphs, we see that ρA = 1/N if and
only if aGaR = bGbR. By similar reasoning, we find that ρA > 1/N > ρB when aGaR > bGbR and
ρA < 1/N < ρB when aGaR < bGbR.
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